7 august 2013

184.Destruction of Yugoslavia - Clear-headed Programming of an Inferno - an realy-case scenario

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We have made this work in English because of a lot of english language readers.

Under this heading we are at the onset of a serial with a study beginning here our colleague Costas.
This study deals with the way in which it has been removing Yugoslav state and the destruction of the company which was both political and economical has shown that the idea of "two systems in one "is viable, can bring political prestige and prosperity until the day ... go to disturb the world.
We bring to this problem for a number of reasons, among which the fact that Romania was political and economic partner of primary eastern block - Yugoslav republic is regarded as undesirable for the remainder of that of C. A. E,R. and boycotted by them.

    Another reason is that Romania had become dizident in the communist block and the path that she had begun to go no longer enjoyed that neither Eastern nor Western countries.And maybe that's why we've had a revolution and now organizers say it will destroy us paternally and advised by the same member wise that when they agreed they have kissed in places delicate and on NATO and the Romanians.
   And there are other reasons, but you'll find them in the course of publication.
   The study is particularly well-documented and argued and I would ask that you patience to follow.

- nemotoujours -

We'll start with its introduction :
The Death of Josip Broz Tito on 4 May 1980 represented a shock not only to Yugoslavia and in particular, in the case of western states. The scale funeral bill would in his own honor - the largest in the history of humanity - have to conclude a fact already knew: inheritance left behind to will be a burden for the whole of Europe. Disappearing "hand of iron "were born soon ethnic tensions and on the background to those constitutional changes have been to the detriment of serbians; Kosovo was well known on that which enraged spirits on international scene desiring to be recognized as being a Yugoslav and not a province of a clear reason and simple: this recognition should be got the green light of secession and therefore independence.On this subject I'll axis in a separate chapter due to the complexity of the situation on this this territory.

-Costas-

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CHAPTER I



Subchapter 1.1 The concept of the use of force in the view of international law

           

The history of mankid in its display had an impact which is felt even today in its level of complexity and persistence. Evolution has brought with itself benefits and also destructive elements, the main cause being the undeniable link with the human structure. If we make an incursion in the past we will find that the events which determined major changes on the international scene were those which implied military actions, the main instrument was often the  uncontrolled force. However this dark side lies in us human beings, in a latent state. Truly shocking and intriguing is lifting it at the rank of state policy. This medieval and primitive reminiscence in essence, hasn’t been eradicated and continues to endure in the collective conception at a global scale. 

            A turning point was reached during the two world wars which became both sources of rewriting the norms that guide the nations and also a heavy heritage in the view of the normal course of history. The political crisis in that period needed a bold and efficient approach: the U.N. Charter was signed in San Francisco on 26 June 1945[1]. Everything started to materialize, a new stage that should have led to the much dreamt objective became reality: peace between states. Yet a question regarding the durability of this document was starting to take routes. The preamble of the Charter is quite eloquent, it practically  defines the essence of this great importance document. The basis, in this case, is maintaining peace and international security, device that was propagated throughout time on different ways. The analysis, in the case of the use of force by the states, can be summarized to two articles: article 2 (4) („All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”), and article 51 („Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of the right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsability of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security”).

But these provisions were formulated in 1945 and so a controversy is being raised: are these anachronistic or there can be adapted to the present? Even if we find a possible solution we must identify the organ which is entitled to do so in this sense. The existence of the U.N.[2] can reveal ourselves an answer in this direction. Starting from the Charter we can consider that the practice of the states to use force in certain circumstances is in the same way condemned or approved by two U.N. organs: General Assembly (UNGA/GA)[3] and Security Council (UNSC)[4].

Regarding the international security domain, the Security Council has the main role, being the only organ that can adopt mandatory resolutions, based on Chapter VII of the Charter. These resolutions can also have effects on the military side, because article 42 in the Charter – „should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such actions may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations”- implies the use of aerial, naval and terrestrial forces. Noticeable is the phrase „take such action... as may be necessary”; its ambiguity and general characteristic leave place for some interpretations determines us to deduct that, in a certain manner, the use of force itself may represent adequate measure in a given scenario. A contradiction is revealed to us even from the start: being forbidden, force can be used both by the state in the light of its right to self-defence -individually and collectively- and by the U.N. The importance of this principle from article 2 (4) Charter was reiterated with the adoption by the U.N. General Assembly of the resolution  2625 (XXV)/1970[5].

            Having in mind the aspects exposed above, we will recall the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice in order to discover how this principle is viewed by the Court and what are the consequences of an eventual infringement.



Subchapter 1.2 International Jurisprudence



            The case which was on the Courts list between the Republic of Nicaragua and United States in 1984[6] had a fundamental importance in the light of the interpretation of the nonuse of   force principle. The litigation started due to the fact that U.S.A. wanted to replace the sandinist political regime in Nicaragua, which had a communist doctrine, using guerilla troops called Contras which engaged in different incursions at the border of the Nicaraguan state. The Court, for reaching at a fair conclusion, established the content of the law to be applied in this case. Therefore, the Court observed that the principle of the nonuse of force which is in the U,N. Charter corresponds in essence with the customary international law (chapter X, paragraph 2). The custom is defined as a general practice, relative long and repeated by the states, considered by them as an expression of rules of conduct with mandatory legal force (a legal norm)[7]. Practical speaking, it is the norm that must regulate in an obligatory manner the relations between states. Then, the Court referred to the article 51- the inherent right to self-defence- an exception of the principle affirmed above, this right activates only in the case of an armed attack. Thus, the response to such attack must be proportional and in the same time necessary. The particularity in this case was that U.S.A. invoked in its defense the collective right of self-defense, due to the fact that the troops loyal to the sandinist regime were also making military incursions at the borders of the states in the vicinity, in our case El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica. After the review by the Court it was revealed that the states weren’t victims of an armed attack, because the incursions, viewed individually but also globally, can’t constitute an armed attack; continuing with its explanations, the Court affirmed that the actions initiated by the defendant state (financing, logistic support, equipment for the guerilla troops) didn’t pay tribute to necessity and proportionality. It was established that it was an infringement of the principle of the threat of force or the use of force by the U.S.A. ( chapter XI, paragraph 1).

            Another case judged by the Court, in which there were reiterated the principles of the interdiction of the use of force and of nonintervention, was that between the Democrat Republic of Congo and Uganda[8]. On 23 June 1999, Congo addressed a legal claim to the Court in the view of certain military actions- which make an armed agression- perpetrated by the ugandan state on its territory.  In a similar way with the case presented, there is reference by Uganda to the self-defence right, in this situation  we have a response to the frequent attacks by paramilitary groups financed both by Sudan and Congo. Yet, the conclusion was that despite the fact that there are no substantial proofs regarding the defenendant states claims of presumptive implication of the two states in aiding the paramilitary activities, the principle of self-defense can’t be called upon, because the Ugandan state never reported to the Security Council that it is a victim of an armed attack. Regarding the two principles, nonintervention and nonuse of force, it was revealed an infringement by Uganda in occupying some territories and the help (financial, logistic, military) offered to the armed groups which took part in military actions at the border with Congo.        

            Although these two reference cases contain a firm interpretation of the principles transposed in the Charter, the international community was often put in an ungrateful position: to blame or to support a military intervention which does not fully respect the international norms, some even being contrary to them! The necessity to substantiate every belligerent action created a series of exceptions which states embraced and promoted.



Subchapter 1.3 Humanitarian intervention



            This justification wasn’t invoked deliberately until recently, doctrine opinions being divided in this sense. The premise from which it can start for the application of this principle can be sometimes shadowed by other interests; relevantly is the case referred to previously, that of Nicaragua against U.S.A., where even if it wasn’t explicitly brought into discussion by the Americans, the court concluded that the measures which United States decided to take by using force weren’t proportionate and close to defend rights eventual violated. The country that decided to elaborate such a doctrine was Great Britain; this was the justification which it formulated in the case of the military intervention, first of this kind, in Iraq caused by the invasion of Kuwait by the Iraqi troops. The purpose of the intervention was to protect the shya and Kurdish minorities, oppressed under Saddam Hussein’s regime. Also, Great Britain stated the conditions necessary for using the instrument of humanitarian intervention[9]: an imperative and urgent situation, characterized by an extreme humanitarian threat which imposes immediate assistance; the other state can’t or is unwillingly to take into consideration or to eliminate the threat; the nonexistence of a practical alternative to that of the intervention to eradicate the threat; the action must be limited in time and purpose.




            This new vision raised many controversies, all of this being reduced to a fair question: does article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter allow humanitarian intervention? This article, in accordance with the parties that accepted this theory, must be viewed in a dynamical perspective, flexible which is beyond the views from 1945. Forward steps were taken in the same direction, a parallel being made between the fundamental human rights and humanitarian intervention: both would be ius cogens norms. The definition of these norms can be found in the Vienna Convention from 1969 on the Law of the Treaties in article 53[10]. Still, for this theory to be viable we have to see in what matter the right of humanitarian intervention is accepted and recognized as human rights are. For this, humanitarian intervention is viewed as a right which is in the state of forming itself, a crystallization process due to the fact that it isn’t provided expressly anywhere. The challengers of this right deny this kind of interpretation, because an unilateral action is excluded by the Charter itself based on Chapter VII- only Security Council can decide upon a military action, unconcerned of the objective or legal justification. In the „Report of the Secretary- General on the work of the Organization” from 1999, the conclusion over the global security was the following: ”What is clear is that enforcement actions without Security Council authorization threaten the very core of the international security system founded on the Charter of the United Nations. Only the Charter provides a universally accepted legal basis for the use of force” [11].

            The division of opinions is clearly visible and leaves place for many interpretations in different ways. Kosovo case became notorious in the way of humanitarian intervention but an exhaustive elaboration i will make in Chapter 2.



Subchapter 1.4 Democratic intervention



            The second thesis became visible as a result of the end of the Cold War[12]. The distribution of power spheres brought to a bipolarization of the international scene thus proving to be a good pretext for some states to get involved in belligerent acts. A telling example is that of the Panama invasion by American troops in 1989. Americans stated that they used the collective right of self-defense for saving the lives of their compatriots, which were endangered under the dictatorial regime of Manuel Noriega and that the Treaty of Panama Channel could be violated by the new regime. Frankly, the restoration of democracy wasn’t in itself a necessity, which animated the Americans, but only an indirect result, hence the existence of a distinction between legal justification and purpose of the action.   

            There was a moment when a military intervention with the purpose of restoring democracy was supported even by U.N., that in Haiti, which was authorized by Security Council in 1994 after the coup d’etat from 1991.We have to note that it was not meant to create a precedent, but due to the circumstances and particularities of the situation  at that time, there was a danger taking shape in the Caribbean region and a solution by any means was imperative       Having in mind the things exposed above, i will present in detail a conflict that shocked the whole world and continues to do so for the simple fact that it occured on the „old continent” , a land of liberty and wisdom! 

   



Chapter II



Subchapter 2.1. The history of the Yugoslav state



            In order to fully understand the disintegration of Yugoslav republic, we have to appeal to history of which can offer explications of its birth and disappearance. Bosnia and Herzegovina played a prime role in this display of events, being so we can start the analysis with it. The particularity of this republic is that it has a profound multiethnic structure, more than the rest of the yougoslav republics. Initial, of over 400 of years, Bosnia was part of the Ottoman Empire. At the north and west was border on Austro-Hungarian Empire, thus resulting in a military frontier between the two empires which brought to the presence of a significant Serbian population-which is even in nowadays- who had the task to protect the territories of Austro-Hungarians against the ototmans starting with the XVI century. Both the religion and Muslim culture on Bosnian territory are thanked to the Turqish occupation, hence a certain number of Slavs converted to Islam. This ethnical and cultural mosaic is completed with the Croat population in the south-west part of Bosnia, closed to Dalmatian coast. In 1878, the Austro-Hungarian Empire occupies Bosnia and Herzegovina, annexing it in 1908. After the first world war and also as a result of the disappearance of the Habsburg Empire, the „Kingdom of Serbians, Croatians and Slovenians” was born out of the unification of the Serbian Kingdom with: Montenegro, Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1929 the kingdom turns into Kingdom of Yugoslavia ( Kingdom of South Slavs). Among a ethnic diversity there was also a religious one which exists also in the present : Catholicism in the north-west of the kingdom and Orthodoxism and Islamism in the south-east.    

   During the second world war, the power of the Axis[13] invaded Yugoslavia, and a part of the territory was enclosed to Italy. Other two parts got under the administration of Bulgaria and Hungary. The rest of the territory belonged to the Croatian state which was a „puppet-state” under the authority of the Axis. A part of Serbia became German Protectorate. This period was a dark one for Yugoslavia, being marked with repressions and brutal treatments applied to the minorities. An armed conflict for national liberation sparked degenerating into a civil war. There were three combatant parties: Ustaše forces of the Croats supported by Axis, Chetnics- Serb nationalists which protected the monarchy- and Partizans- Serbian group with communist orientation; the last two opposed to Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Eventually, Partizans under the guidance of Josip Broz, later known as Marshal Tito, obtained victory. Much of the bloody conflicts occurred on Bosnian territory at the border with Croatia, the majority were against the serbian population which was massacred by the Ustaše forces in 1941. The number of deaths reached one quarter of a million Serbs, but the exact number isn’t known. Despite all of this other ethnic groups were also subjected to repressions, Partizans killed Muslims and Croats in 1941 in Prijedor region and in 1945 near Kozarac. The revenge of the Serbs against Croats culminated after the Croatian state surrendered to the Allies and the execution by Partizans of 100.000 Croat soldiers.   
 

            With Tito taking power, different methods were used to suppress every nationalist tendencies. Under the Constitution of 1946, the Yugoslav state was composed of six republics: Serbia, Macedonia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro plus two autonomous provinces: Vojevodina and Kosovo. A differential aspect was that the Bosnian nation wasn’t recognized at first due to the lack of ethnic homogeneity on its land, this changed in 1974 when Muslims were recognized as one of the nations, peoples of federal Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav state was structured under soviet model: heavily centralized- Belgrade was the administrative center of all the republics- and the exercise of religious rights very much limited; although at first sight it may not seem a element of great importance, the religious mosaic- Christians, Catholics, Muslims- can be a vivid reminder of the historical divisions which stood as ground for fierce rivalries. The core which was formed would soon be destroyed by political tensions and certain external interests which will be revealed in the following subchapter.   



Subchapter 2.2 The crumble of the state- the dissipation of the „Great Serbia” dream



            The socialist stiffness of federal type was fully affected by the adoption of a new Constitution in 1974. It provided the replacement of the president office who was at that time Tito, with the Presidency of Yugoslavia composed of nine members: one representative from each republic and from the autonomous provinces ( Vojevodina and Kosovo); this system was based on a mechanism of rotation constituted in mandates on short terms. The importance of this constitution resides from the fact that it makes a sudden pass from a heavily admnistrative centralization at one based more on self determination and greater legislative freedom for the republics. Now the influence of Belgrade was limited on just taking and applying the decisions regarding the two provinces, but even those had the right to vote so they could oppose.  

       The death of Josip Brotz Tito on 4 may 1980 represented a great shock not just for Yugoslavia, but even more for the western countries. The amplitude of the funeral in its honor- the biggest in the history of mankind- revealed an already known fact: the heritage left behind would be a heavy burden for the whole Europe. Now that the „iron hand” was gone, soon ethnic tensions raised which were also encouraged by the constitutional changes which were against the Serbian interests. Kosovo was the most which inflamed the spirits on the international scene, the purpose was to be recognized as republic and not a province for a clear and simple motive: this would have meant green light for secession and independence. On this matter i will emphasize in a different subchapter due to its complexity.

            Although i started with politics, i am forced to make a change in my account for chronological reasons and to approach other domain that stood at the base of the disintegration of the state, that of the economy. At first Yugoslavia was a industrial power in the region, having a economy of success: a raise of its annual GDP in average with 6,1% ( more than other states in the West of Europe), the medical service was free, the right of a place to work was guaranteed and life expectancy was at 72 years. A socialist economy, but with distinctive elements: companies with private capital, industry under the state’s control and working cooperatives. Being situated at the border between east and west, Boris Tito fully exploited this fact acting as a mediator in the Balkan region between the two power poles, being in the same time one of the main founders of the Group of the 77[14] and of the Non-Aligned Movement [15]. After some years after Tito’s death, the yugoslav economy started to visibly decline. In 1984 the administration of Reagan[16] issued  the National Security Decision Directive 133[17], its provisions were made public in 1990; it clearly specifies the american policy regarding Yugoslavia. One of the measures draws attention in a special manner and will trigger a series of actions which will bring the yugoslavs into their knees: in the last phrase of the fourth paragraph it states:” U.S. policy will be to promote the trend toward an effective, market-orientated Yugoslav economic structure”. In conclusion, the dismemberment of a state with a social approach which didn’t correspond to the democratic standard characterized by a rapacious corporatism. The context of this document was that of distribution of the spheres of influence, emphasized on the south-east region, all of this caused by the political and economical crissis in U.S.S,R. The document will influence the „democratic interventions” in the future of the american administration. The scenario created is as subtle as it can be, but also diabolical-„How to destroy centuries of history in some years” by Ronald Reagan.

            The yougoslav regime was at a turning point, so the American Congress decided to send in 1988 counselors from National Endowment for Democracy –N.E.D. This non-profit organization was financially supported by America and had as objective to promote democracy and capitalist principles, but in reality was nothing but an instrument by which political interests were accomplished by the American state. These counselors used different methods, especially financial ones, by which opposition, N.G.O.’s for human rights and journalists received considerable aid. This organization has in its structure an institution called Center for International Private Enterprise- C.I.P.E. which is under the umbrella of American Chamber of Commerce; this center created „Group 17” – G17: N.G.O. formed by 17 economists who promoted the principles of liberal market, three of whom were members of the World Bank and International Monetary Founds: Dušan Vujović, Željko Bogetic şi Branko Milanović.    The  coordinator of this organization in Yougoslavia was the minister of privatization Veselin Vukotic, collaborator of World Bank and the main pawn in implementing the program which fallowed to bankrupt commercial companies, both public and private, in the end being closed or sold at low prices. In a relative short period of a year (1989-1990) 1.100 were bankrupted. These measures were accompanied by those which destroyed the social character of economy such as reducing the salaries and the suspension of state subsidies. This network with international ramifications contributed in impoverishing the people- the unemployment rate rose with 20%- this economical framework being propitiously for rising social tensions which will become ethnical. Practically, we have assisted at the plantation of extremely dangerous seeds which will know uimaginable consequences. The visit of prime-minister Ante Marković in United States in 1989 in which he tried to obtain financial help of a billion dollars, was an alarm signal raised to the international community. The answer took a legislative form in the shape of a law adopted by the American Congress on 5 November 1990 – Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1991. This law in an elaborate one containing methods by which America will get involve in different international problems in that period of time; at a closer look we will find section 599A[18].

YUGOSLAVIA

SEC. 599A. Six months after the date of enactment of this Act, (1) none of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to this Act shall be obligated or expended to provide any direct assistance to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and (2) the Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Executive Director of each international financial institution to use the voice and vote of the United States to oppose any assistance of the respective institutions to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Provided, That this section shall not apply to assistance intended to support democratic parties or movements, emergency or humanitarian assistance or the furtherance of human rights: Provided further, That this section shall not apply if all six of the individual Republics of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have held free and fair multiparty elections and are not engaged în a pattern of systematic gross violations of human rights: Provided further, That notwithstanding the failure of the individual Republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to have held free and fair multiparty elections within six months of the enactment of this Act, this section shall not apply if the Secretary of State certifies that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is making significant strides toward complying with the obligations of the Helsinki Accords and is encouraging any Republic which has not held free and fair multiparty elections to do so.

            It strictly refers to Yougoslavia and to the measures which will be taken reagrading its faith:

1.      The yougoslav republics will have to organize, within six months of the enactment of the act, free elections in each republic

2.      The financial aid will be distributed individualy to each republic and only to democratic parties or movements which militate for human rights- of course this criteria is met only in the case that these entities are in accordance with american standards and interests

            In my view these provisions mentioned above don’t represent a political blackmail, but more of a death sentence; without any doubts in the light of these pieces of information, the internal tensions in the Yugoslav republic didn’t predate but escalated due to the foreign intervention. This is how a state- which is perceived as a „policeman of justice and democracy” infringes a fundamental U.N. principle, that of non intervention in internal affairs of another state (Article 2 - „The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles: 7.Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Chapter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII”).

                  Isn’t economical blackmail a manifestation of the use of force by the states? The disintegration of the Yugoslav state was genuine or artificially created? Leaving these rhetorical questions that lead us to new ones, i will expose the effects of this American law. In 1991 the inflation had a hallucinating increase of 200%, the government being in incapacity of payment to its creditors and republics and in the end, the whole fiscal system collapsed. Parliamentary elections were organized so republics started to unliterally declare their independence: the first were Slovenia and Croatia on 25 June 1991 and recognized by the European Community on 15 Janurary 1992; Macedonia did it in September 1991,  Bosnia in March 1992, recognized by U.S.A. and EC in april. After these changes, in April 1992 the Yugoslav Federal Republic was born, formed by Serbia and Montenegro. Republics becoming free were governed by nationalist parties who exacerbated the cultural, ethnical and religious differences, thus a military conflict becoming an efficient way to settle up.    



Subchapter 2.3 Bosnia Herzegovina – Europe’s open wound



            The disintegration of federal Yugoslavia was soon followed by the Bosnian one, the perspective of a real war in the region started to appear. The lack of ethnical uniformity- in the same territory living Serb Bosnians, Croat Bosnians and also Muslim Bosnians - made things more complicated. The leadership of the state had a visible diversity: the president was a muslim, president of Parliament was serb and the prime-minister was a croat. A strong anti muslim wave marked  beginning of the 90’s, both the serbs and croats wanted to exclude the muslims from the leadership of the state. All of these obstacles could have been overpass and there would have been no military escalation if the Peace Plan „Carrington-Cutileiro” would have been implemented; this initiative had its roots in the Peace Conference organized by the European Community in February 1992. The document proposed a system which awarded the power to the local ethnic communities, without any central government, but local ones and in the same time the state would have been structured in districts which belonging to the minorities, even though they didn’t have the majority in them. Initially the serbs rejected the plan because they considered they were entitled to 2/3 of the bosnian land, leaving behind the other rights of the minorities; the plan was revised, and on 18 march 1992 the representatives signed:  Izetbegović Alija – for the muslims, Radovan Karadžić – for the serbians, Mate Boban – for the croats. Surprisingly, on 28 March, Izetbegović Alija withdrew its signature after meeting with the american ambassador in Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmermann. The reason behind this action would have been that of a solid assurance from United States regarding the recognition of the independence, which did happen in April that year.  

            The president of the Republic of Serbia Slobodan Milošević (1989 – 1997), subsequently of the Yugoslav Federal Republic (1997-2000), represents a key player in the future events. Charismatic politician, having built a true personality cult, exerted a great influence over the serbian media, including that in serb dominated regions in Bosnia. In a convincing way, serbians were manipulated by appealing to atrocities committed against them, factor which inflamed their nationalistic spirit. Peace that reigned among the communities was transformed, in a systematic and efficient way, in one of fear, hostility and mistrust. Politics and media played a fundamental role in  dividing the state on nationalist lines.

            In april 1991, several serbian communities associated creating a structure which initially had only economic powers and not administrative; these structures existed especially in zones were serbs held the majority. Even so, in a relative short period of time and using these structures, separate Parliaments and police forces appeared, eventually culminating with the proclamation of some autonomous serb regions excluded from the bosnian government:Krajina, Romanjija şi Stara Hertegovina. In March 1992, the Popular Parliament of the Serbs in Bosnia Hertegovina, who’s president was Radovan Karadžić, proclaimed the Constitution of the Serbian Republic in Bosnia- Srpska Republica- thus becoming a distinct republic. A tragic event that triggered all these moves took place at the beginning of the month: a muslim opened fire at a serbian wedding, killing the father of the groom. During the same night, armed serbs organized barricades inside Sarajevo. Neither the police nor the bosnian army didn’t have at their disposal sufficient weapons to repeal the rebellion; the city center belonged to the muslims, and the rest of the city, including the hilltops surrounding the city, to the serb militias. A eventual conflict terrified the population. On 3 march, the leader of the serbs Radovan Karadžić and that of the bosniaks,Izetbegović Alija, met and reached a compromise. But the fate of Bosnia will be decided in the end: Slobodan Milošević and the president of Croatia, Franjo Tudman, divided the state along the river of Neretva. At these discussions, no representative of the muslims attended.

       From this moment, Milošević’s plan started to take ground; a military intervention in Bosnia orchestrated by the Yugoslav Federal Army would have been promptly sanctioned by the international community. As supreme commander of the army, he ordered the transfer of every bosnian serb from the yougoslav army in units which were on bosnian territory- a total of 8.000 soldiers fully equipped, having at their disposal including tanks and heavy weaponary. In addition there were also paramilitary troops: armed by the secret yougoslav police and leaded by nationalists; Among them, remarkable was Željko Ražnatović, also known as „Arkan”, the leader of the group ”Tigers of Arkan”. A considerable amount of atrocities that had occurred, were committed by these groups and not serbian soldiers. First captured city, in three days, was     Bijeljina, with a significant strategic importance. In this place, Arkan’s troops rounded the activists of the Muslim Party and executed them; in this sense we have proofs regarding their actions and presence, photos made by the photographer Ron Haviv who was invited by Arkan. [19]



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4

  
As a consequence of the events in Bijeljina, president Alija made an appeal to the whole population, careless of ethnicity, to protect the states integrity. On 5 April 1992, the streets in Sarajevo were flooded with thousands of people who managed to occupy the building of the Parliament. They opposed to nationalist policies promoted by both Alija and Karadžić; the latter was in Holiday’s Inn hotel close to the Parliament and ordered his militias to suppress mass of the people which headed towards the hotel. Serbian snipers who were on the roof of the hotel opened fire and killed six civilians. Bosnian police managed to regain order in the city. Troops loyal to Karadžić retreated from the city and launched an attack with mortars using the advantage of the hilltops. Attention was moved to other territories in Bosnia: where serbs were the majority, those were brought the control of the serbian military units but, where muslims had the majority, the mayors of those cities received order to surrender. The city which was first occupied Zvornik[20], the artillery barrage offered protection to the paramilitary troops who continued what they had started in Bijelina. From 49.000 muslims who lived in the city none remained, some were killed and others deported in concentration camps! Ethnic cleansing operations start to take shape. On 2 may 1992 the assault on Sarajevo began, initiated by the serbian federal troops; it was attacked on three side, being encircled in this manner. Artillery, serbian fighter jets contributed in creating a chaotic atmosphere in the city. Commander of the troops in Sarajevo was named Ratko Mladić. In the course of the same month, on 22, Bosnia Herzegovina became member of the U.N. [21] along with the republics which declared independence. A problem of international law was raised by Bosnia: in 1991 the resolution of the Security Council 713[22] imposed a military embargo on the whole yougoslav territory- member of U.N. since 1945- based on Chapter VII, so it had binding effect. Bosnia invoked that now it represents a new entity in U.N. and claimed the inapplicability of the embargo, because it’s no longer a yugoslav republic. The inherent right of self-defense of each state enshrined recognized in article 51 has priority over the measure taken by the Security Council and needs to be lifted in order to assure  defense against Serbia and Montenegro. Debates started in the Security Council where different opinions emerged: lifting or suspending the measure, inapplicability to Bosnia. In the end, the Council remained with its initial decision fearing of a dangerous precedent [23].

            This decision i consider questionable, mainly because the bosnian state was practically deprived of a fundamental right which activates itself in certain circumstances. Clearly, exceptions are of strict interpretation and this why they are being applied in a restrictive manner, in our case the use of force; the bosnian armory was insufficient and inferior to the serbian one. This disadvantage didn’t hinder a series of ferocious attacks conducted in the villages around Srebrenica, where the majority were serbians.; these belligerent actions were coordinated by Naser Orić, an officer of the Bosnian Army (1992-1995) from Srebrenica. Serbian population of  Kravica[24] was massacred sadistically, the attack having also profound religious connotations: muslims against christians; 50 serbs were mutilated and executed. On 16 April 1993, Security Council voted the resolution 819[25] based on Chapter VII; this document should have ended the military and humanitarian crisis in Bosnia. Srebrenica, and other cities around it became „safe areas”. The initial resolution proposed by the permanent venezuelan representative at the U.N., Diego Arria, had the syntagm „safe haven” this meant the protection of Srebrenica by the peacekeeping troops. Western states didn’t want this, considering that a complete military protection can’t be viable, everything reduced to prevent the attacks from Srpska’s army. Putting all together, we realize that the international community never wanted a direct confrontation, moreover a military one with Belgrade. Next day, the resolution to the two generals: Ratko Mladić şi Sefer Halilović. Mladić was clear: Srebrenica will be spared if the muslim population would lay down their weapons. In the same time, muslims must stop the attacks against serbians. Srebrenica and other cities would become demilitarized zones and this situation would be monitored by U.N.’s peacekeepers. Finally, the two reached consensus. But these conditions were by no means respected- bosnian army surrendered only part of its armament- but a flagrant infringement was brought to light in a report[26] from 2002 published by Netherlands Institute for War Documentation. I will stop the chronological course of events to present some proofs. In this report events prior, during and after the siege of Srebrenica are being documented; what i will expose it can be found in more detail in Annex 2 of the document,Chapter 4, page 2744. From the first paragraphs there is a reference of a discovery made by the american secret agency (C.I.A.) on 4 September 1993: a Boeing 747 belonging to the national company Iran Air, was on Zagreb’s airport. Inside the plane were found military equipments all destined for the bosnian army, the whole cargo was confiscated by the americans. On 1 November, another iranian Boeing 747 landed on the same airport in Zagreb, this time with humanitarian aid. From the beginning of 1992 deals were being made for mutual aid between three states: Iran, Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina; the leaders met several times in the view of boosting their diplomatic and economic relations. Turkey put itself on the list in 2002 by offering military aid directly to the bosnian state. The american administration was in a dilemma: to take part or not in these operations. Interest in the region was relatively high, the balkans representing a window for the Middle East. A new strategy regarding this conflict was configured: lifting the arms embargo imposed by resolution 713 previously mentioned and an energetically use of the air forces against serb forces in case of their possible opposition at the humanitarian transports. Clinton was in favor of this change of optics, but the european states rejected on pure political reasons: the U.N. soldiers were their own citizens, and an eventual escalation of the conflict would have meant casualties among them. The fact that the flux of weapons continued unhindered was because of the american state that didn’t take any actions to stop this flagrant violation of the resolution, even though they had knowledge, and in the same time due to a flaw in the provisions of the resolution that didn’t mandate the peacekeeping troops to monitor eventual violations of the embargo or to effectively implement it. Operation „Croatian pipeline” officially received the green light from the americans in 1994, in the shape of the Washington Agreement which laid down the basis of a Federal Bosnia and Herzegovina composed in bosnian and croatian territories. The fact that Iran was directly involved in this network involving weapons smuggling operations was for U.S.A. a big concern, that of inoculating extremist ideologies in the balkans, which would have become in time a matter of national security; also, president Alija was himself worried for the fact that croatians held an exclusive control on the military supply from Iran, confrontations between these two balkan states occurred in the past.      

            In 1995, operation „Black Flights” entered on the scene of this conflict: several Hercule C130 planes overflow the bosnian airspace and delivered military equipments on Tuzla airport, one of the biggest in Bosnia. These were seen by the U.N. personnel who were nearby the airport. The cargo contained: light weapons, ammunitions, uniforms and anti-tank arms. The cargo was then taken by bosnians and transported in the town of Zepa having as final destination Srebrenica. General Mladić complained over these violations of the deal it had with the bosnian counterparts regarding the demilitarized zone. Although the provenance of these airplanes wasn’t discovered, because there wasn’t any distinctive sign on them, all the looks concentrated on the americans who initiated in their name a series of counter reports which contradicted those of the U.N. The explanation for the presence of the C130’s and of the two fighter jets which escorted them was that of a military drill conducted in cooperation with N.A.T.O. Some hints drives us to America’s implication in this operation: a number of bosnian soldiers were seen wearing new uniforms, having on them the american flag and also during the  interval of time in which the deliveries were occurring ( during the night in all the cases ), radar aircrafts AWACS type  which were in the vicinity of the airport either didn’t function, or onboard were american crews. Another explanation of these flights was of Turqey’s implication which had in its air fleet these type of Hercule and which took off from the occupied territory in Cyprus. Undisputed is that the americans facilitated  these operations by the measures taken regarding air monitoring. In the light of international law these flights infringed two fundamental resolutions adopted by the Security Council: the first 713, and the second 816[27], the latter forbidden any type of flight over the bosnian territory. These violations weren’t sanctioned, occurring under the international community eyes, no state putting an end to them.  

            Accusations were also from the bosnian side who claimed that serbians were arming themselves and were receiving heavy weapons, including tanks, and that this support came from the border zone between Republic of Srpska and the yugoslav state. The report makes reference to the fact that even though rumors existed regarding the military actions, there were no clear proofs found in the U.N. archives. The aid was limited only to logistical support, supply of military components, communication equipment and payments to the military personnel of the Republic of Srpska. The result of the report was that the implication of Belgrade although existed, it wasn’t in a direct manner.   

            The conclusion in this case was reiterated in the verdict of the International Court of  Justice in the case „ Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro[28]. The argument of the court started from the international rule by which an act committed by a organ of a state which infringes norms of international law is attributed to the state itself. In this sens there is no clear evidence to affirm that both Republic of Srpska, and its army are organs of the yugoslav stare from the point of view of the national yugoslavian law. In favor of this reasoning it was invoked the previous jurisprudence of the court–Nicaragua vs U.S.A. case- in which it was specified that individuals, groups of persons or entities can be viewed as acting in the name of the state with the condition of being completely dependent on it. As so, in our case, it couldn’t be proved that the individuals or entities who committed  acts of genocide in Srebrenica represented an instrument of Belgrade, being assimilated to it; on the other hand, Yugoslavia truly offered  substantial support to the Republic of Srpska, mainly pecuniary (payments to the officers of Sprka’s army ), but this didn’t imply the ideea of a organ of the yugoslav state. The next step was for the Court to analyse the control manifested by Belgrade, although they weren’t organs of the state a question of acting in the light of the instructions or control from the yugoslav state appears. The customary norm regarding international liability dictates that the conduct of a individual or group of individuals would be considered as being of the state based on international law, if that individual or group acts in fact at the instructions, directions or under the state’s control. It was again mentioned the Nicaragua’s case, from which it results the effective control criteria  that includes this norm. The conclusion was that there weren’t any acts under the instructions or control of Yugoslavia, but even more the atrocities were individually inflicted on the civil population at the initiative of some army members of the Republic of Srpska. In paragraph two of the Court’s decision it is specified that Serbia did not commit acts of genocide by its organs. Having in view this decision i can say that all that i have presented until now paint the true reality which is free of any petty interests that slowly but certainly led everybody to one-way road to perdition. I will now return to the initial course of events.

            The resolution of the Security Council from 6 may 1993 number 824[29] extended the concept of „safe area” to other cities: Sarajevo, Žepa, Goražde, Tuzla şi Bihać – operative clause, article 3. The manner of approaching the situation isn’t one that is in accordance with reality, due to the fact that this concept isn’t clearly defined in any resolution; the report of the Secretary General from 1 December 1994[30] explains the situation. Some rules are recommended which applied will confer increased efficiency to this measure, among them: a clear establishment of the safe area, total demilitarization of the area, complete freedom of movement/transit of the local population, U.N. troops and also humanitarian aids. All the measures are found in page 15 of the report where are also detailed. Essential is the total demilitarization of these areas, because many attacks were from this area: military equipments and in the same time military camps were in these places. The ambiguity of the purpose of these protected areas was perceived by the serbs as a facilitation awarded to the bosnians to maintain those territories and not for civil protection. Time passed and a fast solution was needed, so a eventual peace treaty took shape.

            The Vance-Owen Peace Treaty included the partition of Bosnia into ten semi-autonomous regions by ethnical criteria. Milošević himself accepted this ideea, and in may 1993, during the Conference in Athens, was signed by the three representatives of the minorities in Bosnia: Alija- bosniaks, Tuđman – bosnian croats and Karadžić- bosnian serbians; the signature of the  latter would take effect only with the condition of the ratification by the Parliament of the Republic of Srpska. The treaty was accompanied with a determined „NO” from the politicians. The creation of a strong and independent serbian state would have been impossible due to the partition, a unitary and ethnically pure state was desired. Those who first broke the plan were the bosnian croats, with the purpose of retaking the territories from the south of Bosnia; the city of Mostar was divided between the muslims and croats. The american administration got effectively involved, succeeding in ending this conflict by signing a peace deal between the president of Bosnia and that of Croatia. Consequence of the parties reaction to the Vince-Owen peace  treaty, resolution 836[31] from 4 june 1993 introduced for the first time from the beginning of this war a new instrument: use of force. Visibly the events took an unexpected turnover, and the international community was totally surprised, the rejection of the treaty was a hard blow given to the last hope of peace. In the operative clause, articles 9 and 10 contain the construction „necessary means”, in the first of the two it is explicitly used the use of force concept. At a close review of the resolution, we will find out that force would be used if two conditions are fulfilled: the peacekeeping troops are attacked or the safe areas are bombarded and if the approval from the Security Council and Secretary General exists. Corroborating these with article 5 in which it is reiterated the idea of preventing the attacks  by the U.N. troops, it results a total lack of reaction in the majority of the cases. Under no circumstances the intention of direct confrontation didn’t exist and not even that of saving the civil population, who was left under the protection of approximately 500 soldiers who were in each of the so called „safe areas”. I consider that it was waited for a wrong step from the serbians, an eventual attack which would soon come, so that the presence of the soldiers would materialize. The most condemnable is the false hope that civilians legitimately nurtured in avoiding an unwanted tragedy which was artificially created by a third party, U.S.A. Having in mind what i said above, the explosion in Bosnia’s capital followed the natural course of inertia.          

           Sarajevo returns in public’s attention on 5 February 1994: explosion in the market of  Markale[32]. Serbians were those blamed, and N.A.T.O. reacts for the first time, giving a ten days ultimatum ordering the retreat of  the serb artillery positioned on the hilltops that surround the city; if not, the Alliance would have started bombarding  serbian military positions. This ultimatum was backed by U.S.A. and Great Britain. Russia’s intervention in this equation was determinative, the president Boris Yeltsin reached an agreement with Karadžić, and in the last day of the ultimatum russian troops reached Sarajevo, thus a future N.A.T.O attack was virtually inexistent. The serbians, under the protection of the russians, accepted the conditions. This submission was just a way of diffusing the hostile atmosphere created around them and also bought some time for the planning of  a future offensive. In April 1994, the serbs launch an attack against the city of Goražde, which was under U.N. protection. At first there wasn’t any response to this attack, but after an exchange of fire between the serbian troops or Srpska and U.N. troops from which resulted an allied casualty, N.A.T.O. on the grounds of resolution 836 bombarded a tank and a command post. Mladić ordered his troops to encircle 150 U.N. soldiers who took as hostages, threatening with their own lives. Confrontations didn’t occur anymore, but the hostage crisis ended, being freed on 17 April. Mladić’s troops retreated from the city being warned with another ultimatum and fearing of a new series of bombardments. An aggressor can’t be equally treated as one that respects the rules, being of good faith, it must be paralyzed military speaking especially with methods that imply the use of force. An ultimatum is nothing more than a delay and an invitation that can’t be refused to more destruction and reprehensible actions.        Srebrenica was the next enclave that got attacked by Mladić’s troops. It must be mentioned that this operation wasn’t a surprise but foreseeable from three reasons:

1.      Both the military and paramilitary serbian troops were in the area of the enclave since 1992, several confrontations took place for its control between them and the bosnian troops led by Naser Orić.

2.      Frequent attacks perpetrated by the bosnians against the troops of Srpska were coming inside the enclave, although this should have been a demilitarized area and a „safe” one in accordance with resolution of the Security Council; the secret operations previously mentioned assured a permanent flux of weapons 

3.      The attack of the serbian village of Višnjica orchestrated from the order of president Alija on 26 june 1995

      On 6 july 1995, Srebrenica was attacked by the serbians. What fallowed next can’t be rigorously, objectively described existing even today controversies regarding the total number of the victims among the civilians; the numbers circulated bring the loss at thousands, due to the fact that a high number of bosnian refugees sought shelter there, being forced to abandon their homes from the nearby conflict zones. A fact that must be noted is the lack of any type of reaction of the U.N. troops- dutch in the most part. In the same line added to this is the rigidity of the international community which didn’t want to escalate the conflict, the use of fore was totally excluded. Hence we are entitled to affirm that this inconceivable inaction was a form of tacit complicity to the atrocities that were committed! France was the first state that tried to resolve the conflict: military intervention was their solution.The americans for the moment didn’t like this approach, their plan was that of an exchange of territories. Hence the enclaves -where predominant were the muslims- from the border with Serbia would have been given to them, and on the N-S part of Bosnia, where predominant were the serbians, to bosnians ( croats and serbians ). The serbs were those who lost the most, because this move was indirectly following the interests of the croats, who had lost ¼ of the territory to the serbians. The croat offensive began on 4 august 1995 with the siege of the capital of Srpska Knin[33]. The city was occupied relatively easy, the serbs were overwhelmed numerically and military; a great number of serbs fleed or were killed. The victory consecrated the birth of a ethnically pure croatian state.  It would have seen that everything headed to a final defeat of the serbian troops and so to solution of the conflict that had prolonged over the years. The tragedy on 28 august similar to that in Markale had an impact at a international level[34]. The carnage produced signaled the initiation by N.A.T.O. and americans of the bombardments against serb positions on bosnian territory. Operation „Deliberate Force” unfolded between 30 august and 14 september, being one of the biggest of this kind in  both the history of the organization and Europe after the second world war. This is how an organization with defensive purposes, conferred only to the member states, intervines in a conflict which doesn’t target any member and initiates offensive actions. The date of 20 september marks the end of the operation, due to the conformation by the serbians in retreating their artilery around Sarajevo. Sensing the opportunity created, both bosniaks and croats tried to exploit as much as possible the situation in terms of regaining the lost territories. Simetry will be that which will bring to an end the troubled periode: the americans succeeded  in determining the belligerant parties to sign a ceasefire agreement on 5 october 1995, which culminated with the Peace Treaty of Dayton, Ohio

A signature won’t scatter the ghosts of the past who will continue to haunt this hard tried region. The final purpose hadn’t been achieved yet: Yugoslavia still „lived”!





Subchapter: Kosovo- between pretext and desideratum

           

This province was mentioned for the first time as belonging to the medieval state of Serbia. In 1346 the Serb Empire is born, and during the XII-XIV centuries a political and religious center is created in the province. The Kosovo battle from 1389 meant a hard blow for the serbian nation who lost it against the ottomans. Kosovo will be part of Ottoman Empire until 1912. The albanians were those who accepted the islamization of this province, having different posts in the ottoman administration and persecuted the christians, most of them serbs. A division of this province was made since this period, the criteria being a religious one. During the Second World War, the serbs from Kosovo were frequently attacked by the albanians, over 70.000 serbian families fled from these series of violence. Atrocities were committed on the grounds of national ideal of „Great Albania” containing  Kosovo, Metohija, parts of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro and the north of Greece. Tito, as a result of his victory in world war two, issued a decree in 1945 by which serbian families, who were compelled to leave Kosovo, were forbidden to return. Their properties were given to the poor albanians, all of this in the name of unity and yugoslavian brotherhood. During the 40’s, many albanians from Albania established themselves in Kosovo in consequence. Any form of nationalist manifestation, including ctricism the anti-serbian measures were harshly suppressed by the regime. Albanians in Kosovo had a privileged statute, having a better life than in Albania with lots of services and facilitations at their disposal: schools, universities, radio and tv stations etc.    

            The economic crisis at the end of the 70’s which affected Yugoslavia hit especially the albanian minority in Kosovo who due to a lack of professional training, a consistent part of them became jobless. In this cloudy economical context, the start of the 80’s were again marked by attacks against the serbians; as before the national ideal of „Great Albania” stood as ground, Kosovo being considered as belonging only to the albanians. The Constitution from 1974 which i mentioned in subchapter 2.2 contributed in a certain manner in reigniting the self determination flame around the minorities in the federation. The desperate situation of the serbians and the loss of  governmental control of this province brought in 1987 to the visit of Slobodan Milošević who was the president of the Communist Party at that time. A fervent defender of the serbs rights in Kosovo, his statement: „Here nobody is allowed to hurt you” will become a strong stimulant in how Serbia will respond to the crisis. Although the Constitution from 74’ was abolished, the full control of the serbian government couldn’t be imposed in Kosovo: with the help of the Communist Party in Albania parallel state structures are created, with them so separatist movements. A strong military group would soon take control over these movements: Kosovo Liberation Army – K.L.A. This paramilitary organization had an extremist approach, fact which was proved in 1998, when over 400 kosovar albanians were executed just because they opposed the separation from Yugoslavia. In the same year, U.S.A. designated this organization as a terrorist one, with connexions among the organized crime. The fighters were armed and trained by the albanian state. In this matter we can say that Albania becomes an aggressor state, violating the principles of the U.N. Charter, in a stronger manner article 2 (4) and in the same time the  principles inserted in the General Assembly’s resolution 2625(XXV)/1970, mainly that of states refraining from organizing, financing, initiating, inciting or tolerating subversive, terrorist or armed activities which may interfere with a civil conflict from another. This chauvinistic practice of imposing with force your own national desideratum wasn’t sanctioned by the international community. In 1998, a civil war was taken place: serbs were subjected to inhumane treatments ( burned in improvised crematories, women were raped ), and during this time the yugoslav state was trying to reestablish order, but everything meant failure. An exodus of serbian population to other states includin Serbia was nothing but a normal reaction to the unfolding events.       

            The resolution of the Security Council 1160[35] from 31 March 1998 based on Chapter VII had the purpose to find a peaceful solution of this conflict. We can again observe that K.L.A. group is a terrorist one, its actions were characterized as „terrorist actions”. Also to be noted is the measure from the operative clause at paragraph 8, that of a military embargo on the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia- Serbia and Montenegro- including Kosovo. It was the same measure taken in Bosnia’s case which proved to be inefficient. In this situation failure awaited also! At the start of April, clashes intensified, K.L.A. managed to occupy a zone which stretched to the border with the yugoslav state; the yugoslav army and police started operations to free these parts. Things seemed to improve in may, when Russia’s president Boris Yeltsin, and that of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milošević, reached an agreement regarding an international observer mission in Kosovo starting with june. For the second time we see the involvement of Russia in the region’s faith in a dark period, the russians being the only ones that objectively managed to diffuse the situation both now and during the bosnian war. All of these peaceful attempts to end the conflict meant an opportunity for the albanian paramilitary troops to extent their influence in the north of the province. On 23 September, a new U.N. resolution issued by the Security Council also based on Chapter VII came to complete the tragic picture. Resolution 1199[36] imperatively demanded a cease of fire from both sides from this resulting the fact that the previous resolution was in vain. Also there is a reference to the avoidance of „an imminent humanitarian catastrophe” by taking adequate actions; interesting is the introduction in the equation of a certain catastrophe, although neither of the parties stressed on this fact, and even more it might seem that it is forgotten the source of these military confrontations which normally left profound wounds- victims and refugees on either sides- which was linked to a terrorist network with tied ties with the albanian mafia. It must be emphasized on the obvious passivity in sanctioning the albanian state which overwhelmingly contributed in following the course of a „humanitarian crisis”. In October, a ceasefire agreement was implemented by the international mission of the O.S.C.E. in Kosovo. From start this agreement didn’t have a key element to be effective: the signature from the K.L.A. The yugoslav government fulfilled its obligation to reduce the military contingent and to retreat from the occupied areas, while the other side took advantage of this momentum, and military exploited this situation by occupying the territories which were left by the serbians.

            The day of 15 January 1999 will have an emotional impact and it would turn to play a decisive role in the display of events, this date being associated with that of the „massacre of    Račak“. In the early hours of this day, the yugoslav army and serbian police took by assault this village after it had previously used the artillery to siege it; during the whole course of the operation they were assisted from distance by two representatives of the O.S.C.E. and representatives of the international press. All of them were informed by the serbs regarding this action. The purpose of the operation was to gain control from the K.L.A. Sporadic exchanges of fire took place between the serbs and kosovar soldiers who retreated in the wood surrounding the village. The result: 15 casualties among the kosovar soldiers and the capture of armament, so a success. O.S.C.E. representatives entered the village after the operation was finished and realized that mostly it was abandoned, and the persons with who they had contact, despite being wounded, didn’t report anything suspicious. The next day a number of 45 dead bodies lied in a pit in the village!



            The coordinator of the O.S.C.E. mission William Walker, guided by the K.L.A. troops who had retaken the village during the night, blamed without any concrete evidence the serbs. Immediately a series of phone calls were made to american administration denouncing the „massacre”. But the scenario isn’t truly believable for many motives: 

- The fact that everybody was informed over this operation represents a justification of the fact that the serbs hadn’t any intentions to hide its traces

- No immediate thorough investigation was made on the spot from which to result this thing; the cartridges which were found were in smaller number than that of the bodies 

- The remaining civilians, although they knew very well the places in the village, didn’t see anything suspicious until the paramilitary troops came

- The K.L.A. presence is an intriguing one- it can be taken into consideration a possible strategy of them in order to transform a loss into a victory; the victims of the serbian operation might have been placed there an dressed in civilian clothes  

            I consider this episode as a pretext for the whole international community and an emotional blackmail: civilians are getting butchered, and „we” only assist and take act of it happening! If Bosnia had the Srebrenica episode, it looks like Kosovo has the episode of  Račak, but at a lesser scale.

            In Febraury 1999, the Secretary General of N.A.T.O. Javier Solano opens the round of negotiations between the two belligerent sides, these being held in France at the Château de Rambouillet. I mention the fact that the discussions took place under the spectrum of the bombardments being started against Serbia by the Alliance in the case of a eventual failure; in one word, the last chance given to the yugoslavian state. During these talks, two diametrically oppoesed opinions regarding the handling of this conflict emerged: the americans were more radical- if the agreement won’t be signed by the serbs and signed by the albanians, the only solution was that of the use of force. On the other side, the position of Europe represented by Great Britain was that of reaching  a consensus. The political aspects of this agreement were accepted by the serbs, it was wished mainly to extend the autonomy of the Kosovo province, but in no case its independence. One thing couldn’t be agreed upon: the temporary presence of N.A.T.O. troops in order to restore peace in the area; this scenario resembled with one of occupation troops under international mandate! If we study the provisions of this agreement[37], we can make ourselves a detailed opinion over the way the serbs were perceived. The B Annex, pragraph 8, page 44  reveals that ”N.A.T.O. personnel shall enjoy, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY including associated airspace and territorial waters”. May this condition had been imposed to the other partner of discussion the reaction would have been of conformation? The states sovereignty is grossly violated, and this infringement of a fundamental international principle makes me wonder what were the real intentions of the international community concerning the yugoslav republic. Chapter 8, article 1, paragraph 3, page 46, dropes a „bait” which endangers the territorial integrity:”Three years after the entry into force of this Agreement, an international meeting shall be convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on the basis of the will of the people, opinions of relevant authorities..” Establishing a fix moment despite the fact that the situation was extremely complex seems to me an attempt to hurry up the process, so the result becomes inconvenient. The uncertainty which comes with the solution is another factor that influenced the serb’s position: if the albanians in Kosovo would have wanted independence, and the authorities would have supported the cause, then the conflict would have been closed? The criteria are purely subjective and don’t have neither juridical nor diplomatic relevance.  

            The refusal, justified in this case, was categorical. The albanians accept! The american scenario is fulfilled. The result couldn’t have been but only one, and this picture is fully suggestive:



 




            From left to right: Hashim Thaci – the leader of the K.L.A. group, Bernard Kouchner – the U.N. representative in Kosovo, Mike Jackson – the commander of K.F.O.R. troops under U.N.,  Agim Ceku – K.L.A. soldier and  Wesley Clark – N.A.T.O. commander.  

Belgrade represented a target wanted for long time. The vital centre of  Milošević’s regime had to be silenced once and for all. Almost 4 months (24 March-11June) of heavy bombardments on the whole territory of the Yugoslav Republic, including Kosovo. Chaotic and terrifying scenes occurred mainly among the civilians, absolute normal thing since the Alliance backed by U.S.A. unleashed their full military power.   

Both during the night  .And also during the day  :


[39]

[40]
















  

            Taking lives ,spreading pain[41] - the principle by which to violence you respond with violence has been raised at the rank of a solution at a international level. The „Kosovo Report” from 2000[42], made by the Independent International Commission on Kosovo, offered a description of this military campaign. Everything that i will say can be found in the introductive part of the report in which it is made a summary, and in the third part, starting with page 30. From the start, the Commision noticed the fact that, the military intervention orchestrated by N.A.T.O. was illegal, but justified; illegal because it didn’t have the approval of the Security Council based on article 53, paragraph 1 („The Security Council shall, where appropiate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state , as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state”) and justified because all the diplomatic means were exhausted, and the effect was that of liberating the majority of the population in Kosovo from a long period of oppressions under the regime of Belgrade. In the report two mistakes made by the Alliance are identified all of which are in terms of planning

- The campaign was meant to last only a few days, but the duration was much longer-78 days- which took by surprise the governments of the member states 

- N.A.T.O. had mistaken by supposing that the campaign won’t lead to a escalation of the conflict in terms of expulsions and treatment applied to the kosovar albanians  


5
            The accuracy of the bombardments was a doubtful one due to the relatively high altitude at which the jets had to fly in order to avoid the extremely efficient air defense system of the serbs; a clear distinction between the real military targets and those artificially created to deceive, couldn’t be made. The yugoslav army continued its attacks against K.L.A., and the expulsions and oppressions committed against the albanian couldn’t be stopped. In april, N.A.T.O. changed its tactics and started bombarding the infrastructure- bridges, highways, factories etc. From this resulting a number of 500 victims among the serbian civilians; not even the albanians were spared in a incident in which 80 lost their lives: the Koriša tragedy took place because the pilot of an allied jet confused a refugee convoy with that of a military serb one:
 

            The Commission brings to light the fact that the Alliance and U.S.A. used types of weapons and munitions which are forbidden by the Geneva Conventions: cluster bombs- fragments are displaced when explosion occurs and can harm everyone who are in the area, munitions with high uranium concentration. The legacy which was left is being felt even today, situation which was presented by the russian tv channel RT[43]. The conclusion of the Commisison paints the ruthless reality: the war conducted by N.A.T.O. was neither a success nor a failure, it was both! The serbian people suffered the most! Kosovo was lost!

            The involvement of the Alliance became certain in January 1999 when it issued a press declaration[44]. From is beginning there is reference to the resolution 1199 of the Security Council; the crisis in Kosovo represented a „threat to peace and security in the region”, an in this sense the strategy is that „to halt the violence and support the completion of negotiations on an interim political settlement for Kosovo, thus averting a humanitarian catastrophe”.  It might seem that that imminent „crisis” which resolution 1199 mentioned hadn’t taken place since the purpose of N.A.T.O. was to avert it. Also in the declaration it is specified that in case of a diplomatic failure, the Alliance ”is ready to take whatever measures are necessary in the light of both parties compliance with international commitments and requirements”. The similarity of the expression used with that in the resolutions that authorize the use of force by the U.N. member states is striking; with this declaration N.A.T.O.’s policy of finding a solution to this conflict takes shape, and the wide international community knew what will happen next. I think that even if the serbs had accepted the Rambouillet Peace Agreement, bombardments would have still taken place because the purpose wasn’t by no way „humanitarian”, but political, the target being the regime in Belgrade. More intriguing in all of this is how an organization which essence and purpose is purely defensive can resort at attacking another state which has no links with the organization, thus helping a province, which is not even a state, clearly not a member of the Alliance. The answer can be found in the new strategic concept approved by the leaders of the member states in April 1999[45]. During this time the operation was unfolding! The new concept enlarges the role of the organization which includes now management of crisis and conflict prevention by partnerships with states in the Euro-Atlantic region. The purely defensive role is redefined, N.A.T.O. ”contributing to the peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic” – third part of the document. A radical change which happened mainly due to a simple motive: a flagrant infringement of the initial will of the states of the Alliance would have occurred in a grossly manner by resorting to force against Yugoslavia! Kosovo is directly mentioned in this    document[46] formulated after NA.T.O.’s summit in Washington on 24 April the same year, in which a justification of the operation is put in place:”The continuing crisis in and around Kosovo threatens to further destabilize areas beyond the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The potential for wider instability underscores the need for a comprehensive approach to the stabilization of the crisis region in South-Eastern Europe. We recognize and endorse the crucial importance of making South-Eastern Europe a region free from violence and instability”. Only that the desideratum was disregard in terms of the means used, and the military intervention turned against the initiators: albanians were even more oppressed and subjected to violent treatments, which was foreseeable otherwise, things which led to refugee crisis in Macedonia (F.Y.R.O.M.). The albanian exodus from Kosovo to the macedonian borders symbolized a difficult moment, but favorable for new accusations addressed to the serbian government.  
   

            Despite this, the reaction of the Alliance against Yugoslavia wasn’t unanimously accepted by the members, the most vocal one was Greece. In the Security Council debates were held both in favor and against the measure. Those who opposed stated that the action taken by N.A.T.O. was a clear violation of the U.N. Charter, emphasizing on the interdiction in absolute terms of the use of force by states, in the second article, paragraph 4, the primordial role of the Security Council in maintaining peace and international security in the light of article 24 and in the same time on the necessary  authorization by the Security Council based on Chapter VII, at the expense of an unilateral action. Some of the member states supported the idea that N.A.T.O. represents a regional organization in terms of Chapter VII so it is limited to the condition imposed by article 53 by which action that implies force must be authorized by the Security Council[47]. The Security Council  urgently reunited shortly after the bombardments had started [48]. The discussions were contradictory, born from an unseen situation. Russia’s position in the Security Council was firm and acid:”the risk of the allied operation won’t address only the province of Kosovo and Yugoslavia, but the security of the whole Balkan region. The other states allegations regarding the prevention of a humanitarian catastrophe in the region are viable nor they have any legal basis, in the same time, the unilateral intervention consists in itself a possibility of a humanitarian catastrophe”. On the other side, U.S.A. considered that N.A.T.O. acted in order to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe and, also, to hinder new aggressions in Kosovo. In this sense, Great Britain - the first country that elaborated the concept of humanitarian intervention, see subchapter 1.3 – offered a legal argument saying that the military action was legal and justified as being an exceptional measure taken in order to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe, being directed only to this purpose.

            At the second meeting of the Security Council [49] which had on its agenda the vote of a resolution which condemned the use of force by the Alliance, the states couldn’t reach a common position, thus it wasn’t adopted. It mentioned that the unilateral use of force by N.A.T.O. represented a violation of article 2(4), article 24 and article 53. Those who spoke against the military action (Cuba, India, Russia, China, Ukraine and Belarus) were very clear in terms of  violating the Charter, whereas the states that agreed with the military intervention focused on the violent acts that continued against the albanian minority. Previous resolutions of the Security Council were brought into discussion, which demanded the yugoslav state to end its violent policy. Though these resolutions didn’t clearly authorize the use of force by the N.A.T.O. members, some states argued that in a certain way the intervention was justified. France concluded that two resolutions were adopted: in resolution 1199 the Council reaffirmed that the deteriorating situation in Kosovo had become a threat to peace and security in the region. Resolution 1203 demanded the implementation of the agreements between Yugoslavia, O.S.C.E. and N.A.T.O. and how the yugoslav state failed to do so, the military response was a consequence to this. Holland also agreed with these statements and said that the given situation was a complex one and so a conclusion can’t be drawn over this being a strictly unilateral use of force. Slovenia, former Yugoslav Republic, adopted a similar position adding that the responsibility of the Security Council regarding the use of force is primary, but not exclusive, N.A.T.O. being entitled to act. U.S.A. didn’t try to legally substantiate its position, saying only that the Alliance’s actions were fully justified and necessary in order to stop the violence and to prevent a further deterioration of the peace and security in the region [50]

            Humanitarian intervention is frequently used by the states referring to the Kosovo crisis. This aspect  is new and it hasn’t been strictly legally regulated. For this reason, in order to better understand this concept, you must turn to the doctrine regarding it. Author Bruno Simma in its book „NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspect”(1999) makes a step. In his view, if the Security Council determines that gross human rights violations had taken place in a country, which consists in a threat to peace and then appeals or authorizes an action in force to stop these, then a military humanitarian intervention is permitted. In the absence of an authorization, military coercion which proposes to determine the state to respect those fundamental rights represents a violation of article 2 paragraph 4 of the Charter; so both the doctrine and the states reached the same logical conclusion. Continuing, the author affirms that as long as the violence doesn’t spread across the border in way which an armed attack is committed against a state, article 51 – the inherent right of each state to self defense – can’t be invoked. To conclude, any political, ethnical, humanitarian etc. explanation or justification can’t eliminate certain legal forms that must be accomplished for the simple fact that there are the result of the states will, which prevails and fundaments the international law. Throughout time, some common characteristics of this type of intervention crystallized, the source being doctrine itself:   
    

1.      Use of military force – this dimension is due to the fact in the majority of cases, the state against the intervention is conducted to is the source of the rights violations, so this approach is needed

2.      Lack of approval from the state on which it is intervened upon – this element makes the distinction between peacekeeping missions and in the same time makes reference to the main subject, the state, which won’t never agree with this form of sanction   

3.      The purpose is the protection of those of other nationality 

4.      Mediation of the intervention – states intervening on their own („self-help”), but this measure is criticisable, because this action is prefered to take place under U.N. mandate  

         These elements are met in our case, thus doctrinary speaking, states reacted in this sense. The concept is a controversial one and suffered many changes troughout history. During the Cold War, humanitarian interventions – India in East Pakistan today Bangladesh, Tanzania in Uganda – took place even without the Council’s authorization, often these had political valences and marked areas of influence. Once the Cold War ended, the ideea of multilateral intervention took the place of the unilateral one hence avoiding abuses from the powerful states; multilateralism became a guarantee over the legitimacy of the action. Cases in which this type of intervention is applied are associated with those in which grave human rights violation occur, and when there is a threat to peace and security. Still humanitarian intervention isn’t a doctrine and doesn’t have the position of a international norm by which state policies are being shaped; this caution of institutionalization is caused by the states fear to be subjugated to the political influences of the power poles at the international level under this pretext, and in the same time, in case of an authorized intervention, U.N. doesn’t have its own military troops, so the initiation of the operation is decided by some group of influencial states. 

            Year 2001 was a radical one in the sense of those presented above: the canadian government laid down the foundations of the „International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty”, which draw up the report „The responsibility to protect”[51]. Optics schange, and the right to intervene in converted in the responsibility of each state to prevent atrocities being committed by state through different economical, diplomatic means, the use of force would be resorted to in case the first two fail. The report emphasizes on preventing the following types of international crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against peace and ethnic cleansing. This limitation was criticized by the states due to this restriction. At the base of the responsibility to protect are the following principles:

- State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself 

- Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect   

            Debates over multilateralism or unilateralism of the humanitarian intervention disappear, and their place is taken by the sovereignty principle, which in exceptional and of strict interpretation cases, can be mitigated only for social protection purposes. The responsibility to the use of force is given in the last instance to the Security Council based on Chapter VII, and beside this responsibility to react, states have the duty to contribute in post-conflict reconstruction. A negative aspect that with certainty be taken into considerations by the states is its legal force: it isn’t a international law, but a norm based on international law, meant to organize a framework in which means of resolving a conflict mentioned previously are put in place. Through resolution 1674[52] from 26 April 2006, U.N. embraced the principles inserted in the report; a tight cooperation between it and different regional organizations over the prevention of new conflicts was strengthened. In the same time the four pylons that stand at the base of united nation’s system were mentioned: peace, security, progress at international level and human rights. In the same resolution, the organization expressed its deeply regret caused by suffering civilians in armed conflicts, them being the most exposed to the states abuses; a higher degree of protection was granted especially to them. Unfortunately this reaction is delayed which won’t wipe out the caused by an inexplicable passivity of the whole international community, exactly in the crucial moments. The subsequent demarche creates the impression of a penitently attitude by which clemency is  being seek, thing that lacks any moral consistency.  

            Returning to the conflict in Kosovo which prolonged for a long period of time, it ended with resolution 1244[53]. The solution was obviously political, thus both parties accepted to cease hostilities and accept the trusteeship of the international community in this province throughout different peacekeeping mission and post-conflict reconstruction. An essential component of this resolution is that of Yugoslavia’s integrity that won’t be affected in no manner, Kosovo remaining part of the republic but with higher autonomy – article 10, operative clause. The yugoslavs were the one ones who fulfilled their obligations ( the military personnel was retreated), but the albanians continued their attacks, their actions remained the same, with terrorist implications, spreading also in F.Y.R.O.M. (Macedonia). 
    

            Yougoslavia tried to find justice and resorted to the International Court of Justice, issuing a lawsuit against ten N.A.T.O. member states, including U.S.A.: Great Britain, Spain, Italy, Holland, Germany, Canada, Portugal, France and Belgium. The allegations that were brought were that each of the states violated their obligation of not using the force by participating in the allied operation and of not interfering in the internal affairs of a state by training K.L.A. terrorists. Two arguments were elaborated against the military operation: the first was that the is no right to humanitarian intervention in the international law, and the second, even if it were, the methods used, bombardments, don’t make a humanitarian intervention. Supporting its first argument, Yougaslavia revealed that the interdiction in article 2(4) is a absolute one, and intervening for others special reasons than „against territorial integrity or political independence of any state” doesn’t stand up. The formulation, in states opinion, allows the use of force against other purposes than the integrity or political independence. The practice of the states regarding this international norm wasn’t distorted, proof in this sense is that not even one member state could provide substantial evidences from which to result the contrary. In the case of the second argument, Yugoslavia stated that there wasn’t a genuine humanitarian purpose, and it also added that the way in which it was used can’t qualify this operation as a humanitarian intervention; the targets of this campaign, and the  extended geographical area targeted indicate other purposes than humanitarian. Protecting a minority from a region exposed the other communities on the whole yougoslav territory to severe bombardments. In the same time, the threats issued by N.A.T.O. months before starting the operation meant that the result was foreseeable, and acquiring an authorization from the Security Council was never planned to happen. Personally, i consider these arguments logical and common sense, having a legal and political substrate, things which make us to believe that finally light will be brought to this case also, and the desired justice won’t come late. 
Defending themselves, states described the atrocities perpetrated against albanians, the only state that offered a legal explanation was Belgium who showed that the intervention was based on the implicit authorization from the Security Council. It was necessary to intervene in order to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe and to protect fundamental human rights that are ius cogen norms. I consider that a difference must be made between „implicit” and „tacit”! The strong argument is found in previous resolutions that expressed exactly this describing the situation in Kosovo as a threat to peace and security; we can realize that, although it wasn’t certainly demanded, the intervention happened for the simple fact that the use of force wasn’t excluded, neither resolution had excluded the possibility, and this threat was a insidious green light for the use of force. This deduction hasn’t, obviously, any legal consistency and it dangerously creates precedents. Let’s report to a case in nowadays: the situation in Syria has the same ingredients for a so called humanitarian intervention, but nobody is determined to act. Fundamental rights are being violated mainly the right to life, by bombarding civilian areas the number of refugees represents a problem for the neighboring states such as Turkey and Jordan and not to mention that it represents a threat to peace in the region. The explanations offered in the Yugoslavia’s case don’t do anything than to nurture even more the inevitable tensions of such a conflict, thing that was shown during the post-conflict years. Belgium also argued that there was no U.N. resolution which condemned the measures taken by the Alliance, but it is notoriously that the vote  has in 90% of the cases political interests and affinities. The International Court chose a diplomatic answer on everybody’s taste, but one meant to standardize the treatment applied to the serbs: the Court declared itself „concerned” regarding the events that occurred, reminding  the material loss and that of human lives, affirming that all the parties of this lawsuit must take into consideration international law, U.N. Charter, and humanitarian law. This is how the yugoslav state, nation was made „checkmate” in a subtle way and with medical precision. What was wanted was achieved: colonization of the balkans with free markets, western principles and above all, „protection of human rights”!  

            The scenario has ended: Bosnia and Herzegovina tries to escape poverty due to the standards imposed by the European Union, Kosovo developed in a tremendous manner that in 2008 became even a state, and Yugoslavia exists only in the souls and hearts!






CHAPTER III

Conclusions and thoughts



            Serbian, bosnian, croatian, albanian, slovenian or montenegrean? In reality, humans united in language, culture and feeling! No drawn boundary on a computer or on an old map can’t ease the riotousness that will be inherited by generations. Evidently that these events which unfolded are far away and anachronistic in our current context of everybody’s Europe that confronts itself with a crisis at a more elevated level, born from a tight „friendship and cooperation”. But, i can’t believe that someone who lived or had the privilege to inform himself and to know all of this can forget or  consider that everything will be the same. Nothing will be as it was! Painful isn’t the violent display of events, but the misleading even cunning way that some individuals – human beings as us – can model universal values in a way in which it becomes a stimulus for committing atrocities; freedom is what each of us can’t conceive in no way to loose and thus it being one that animates us to separation in the moment in which we are in danger of being without it. The thing that made me wonder a lot in this war is that of disbelief that persists, it couldn’t be eradicated. Horrendous manner in which life can end: killed by a neighbor with who you yesterday talked and helped, killed by a friend on who you could always rely on. This war made more havocs on the psychological realm than in its materiality.   

            I consider that the fate of all the victims was decided earlier, and their chances were as non-existent because those who had to mediate this SOCIAL and not MILITARY crisis created a scenario in accordance with the actual situation: force in the place of words and words in the place of actions! All of these undesired conjunctures which were provoked by different internal and external factors, led to true identity crisis: communities became discriminatory and exclusion transformed itself in an appurtenance criteria. This is the cause of the resounding failure of the international society. My ascertainment is strengthened also by the way things ended: it was concluded that there is only a guilty one and not more.

            A clear evidence of the fact that, in certain situations, lack of involvement is by itself the solution exactly as when we don’t intervene to save a victim from car crash who is stuck in the car and prefer to wait for the medics to come in order not to do more harm. At the beginning of my work i referred to the diversity which is linked to the formation of the yugoslav, and now i can surely say that it is both the cause and the solution. Our human nature is individualistic and our degree of tolerance is relatively low, but this limitation is not insurmountable, and can be cultivated and in the end humanity which lies in each of us will prevail. We might think that the cries for help and prayers of those who left us were covered by the hiss of the bombs and shouts of war, but they are being heard each year!



May peace and harmony return again! 

 - Costas -

8
9















BIBLIOGRAPHY



·         Christine Gray, International law and the use of force , second edition, Oxford university press 

·         Bill Text 101st Congress (1989-1990)H.R.5114.ENR H.R.5114 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1991 (Enrolled Bill [Final as Passed Both House and Senate] - ENR)

·         Năstase A., Aurescu B., Jura C., Manualul de Drept International Public – Sinteze pentru Examen, Edișia 5, Editura C.H.Beck , București, 2009 

·         Rezolutia A/RES/46/237

·         http://www.onuinfo.ro/documente_fundamentale/carta_natiunilor_unite/


·         http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consiliul_de_Securitate_al_ONU

·         http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/348/90/IMG/NR034890.pdf?OpenElement

·         http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/6505.pdf




·         http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/23-2222t.gif 


·         http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-dd9nITrjyM

·         http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/un_arms_embargoes/yugoslavia/yugoslavia-1991/un-security-council-resolution-713-1991

·         http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9OohDHm1mcc&feature=player_embedded#!

·         http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/221/90/IMG/N9322190.pdf?OpenElement

·         http://www.srebrenica.nl/Content/NIOD/English/srebrenicareportniod_en.pdf


·         http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XMkqCncevBA

·         http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xFfDlPpLuLI

·         http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k1QCNeAhxoo

·         http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1160.htm 

·         http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1199.htm 

·         http://smsjm.vse.cz/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/sp30.pdf

·         http://blog.balder.org/billeder-blog/Hashim-Thaci-Bernard-Kouchner-Mike-Jackson-Kfor-Agim-Ceku-Uck-Wesley-Clark-October-1999-320.jpg

·         http://libcom.org/files/images/history/CK_building_on_fire_1999%5B1%5D.jpg

·         http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/images/0504-02.jpg


·         http://sitemaker.umich.edu/drwcasebook/files/the_kosovo_report_and_update.pdf

·         http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DpF7RCpEI8U

·         http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-012e.htm

·         http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm

·         http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm

·         http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/55/United_Nations_Security_Council_Meeting_3988_1010.3370v1.pdf


·         http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf

·         http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1674%282006%29





[1] See http://www.onuinfo.ro/documente_fundamentale/carta_natiunilor_unite/

[2]It is the most important international organization in the world.Founded in 1945, after the second world war, today it has 192 member states. Its creation was made possible by signing, by its members that founded it,  of the U.N. Charter


[4]See  http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consiliul_de_Securitate_al_ONU.

[5] See http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/348/90/IMG/NR034890.pdf?OpenElement

[6] See http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/6505.pdf

[7]See A.Năstase, B. Aurescu, C. Jura, Manualul de Drept Internațional Public – Sinteze pentru Examen, Ediția 5, Editura C.H.Beck, București, 2009  .


[9] See Ch. Gray , International law and the use of force, second edition, Oxford University Press,  Chapter 2, p.35.



[12] The Cold War (1947-1991) was a sustained state of political and military tension between powers in the Western Bloc, dominated by the United States with NATO among its allies, and powers in the Eastern Bloc, dominated by the Soviet Union along with the Warsaw Pact

[13]The Axis powers also known as the Axis Alliance, was the alignement of nations that fought in the Second World War against the Allied forces. The Axis promoted the alliance as a part of a revolutionary process aimed at breaking the hegemony of plutocratic-capitalist Western powers and defending civilization from communism

[14] The Group of the 77 at the United Nations is a loose coalition of developing nations, designed to promote its members’ collective economic interests and create an enhanced joint negotiating capacity in the United Nations. The group was founded on June 15, 1964 by the „Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Countries” issued at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 

[15] The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is a group of states which are not formally aligned with or against any major power bloc. The organization was founed in Belgrade in 1961, and was largely conceived by India’s first prime minister, Jawarhalal Nehru; Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno; Egypt’s second president, Gamal Abdel Nasser; Ghana’s first president Kwame Nkrumah; and Yougoslavia’s president, Josip Brotz Tito

[16]Ronald Wilson Reagan, (b.febraury 1911, Tampico, Illinois - d.5 june 2004, Los Angeles, California) was the 40th President of the United States. As president, Reagan implemented sweeping new political and economic initiatives

[17] See http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/23-2222t.gif.

[18]See Bill Text 101st Congress (1989-1990)H.R.5114.ENR H.R.5114 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1991 (Enrolled Bill [Final as Passed Both Houseand Senate] - ENR).


[20]See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-dd9nITrjyM.

[21]See Resopution A/RES/46/237.

[22]See http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/un_arms_embargoes/yugoslavia/yugoslavia-1991/un-security-council-resolution-713-1991.

[23]See Christine Gray, op.cit,Chapter 4, p.106.

[24]See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9OohDHm1mcc&feature=player_embedded#!.

[25]See http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/221/90/IMG/N9322190.pdf?OpenElement.

[26]See http://www.srebrenica.nl/Content/NIOD/English/srebrenicareportniod_en.pdf.

[27]See http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/187/17/IMG/N9318717.pdf?OpenElement.




[31]See http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/330/21/IMG/N9333021.pdf?OpenElement.

[32]See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XMkqCncevBA.

[33]See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xFfDlPpLuLI

[34]See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k1QCNeAhxoo

[35]See http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1160.htm

[36]See http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1199.htm .

[37]See http://smsjm.vse.cz/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/sp30.pdf

[38]See http://blog.balder.org/billeder-blog/Hashim-Thaci-Bernard-Kouchner-Mike-Jackson-Kfor-Agim-Ceku-Uck-Wesley-Clark-October-1999-320.jpg

[39]See http://libcom.org/files/images/history/CK_building_on_fire_1999%5B1%5D.jpg

[40]See http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/images/0504-02.jpg


[42]See http://sitemaker.umich.edu/drwcasebook/files/the_kosovo_report_and_update.pdf

[43]See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DpF7RCpEI8U

[44]See http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-012e.htm

[45]See http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm

[46]See http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm

[47]See Christine Gray , op.cit., Chapter 2, p.39

[48]See http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/55/United_Nations_Security_Council_Meeting_3988_1010.3370v1.pdf


[50]A se vedea Christine Gray , op.cit.,Chapter 2, pp. 40-41

[51]See http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf